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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and disclosure quality in a 
context of principal-principal conflicts and poor investor protection. Overall, the empirical results 
suggest that minority expropriation risk harms disclosure quality. Specifically, we find that 
disclosure quality is negatively associated with ownership concentration, major shareholder 
voting rights, the existence of double voting rights, and family control. The results obtained also 
evidence a positive relationship between disclosure quality and the existence of executive stock 
option plans giving support that this mechanism plays a key role in corporate transparency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ecent years have seen a spate of regulatory action for the development of corporate governance 
mechanisms and disclosure in response to financial scandals. Most prior research examining the 
relationship between disclosure and corporate governance has concerned the USA (Nagar et al., 2003; 
Ali et al., 2007), a country where investors are highly protected and ownership is dispersed (La Porta et al., 2000), 
and as a result the focus has mainly been on the agency conflict between managers and shareholders (Type I agency 
conflict). However, recent studies show that ownership concentration is prevalent in most economies, for instance 
France, and the main agency conflict is in fact between controlling and minority shareholders (Type II agency 
conflict called also principal-principal conflict) (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Faccio & Lang, 2002). 
 
This paper investigates whether firm-level corporate governance mechanisms supplement regulation to 
protect minority shareholders. We focus on the impact on corporate transparency of different corporate governance 
mechanisms such as the proportion of independent directors in the board (Forker, 1992; Chen & Jaggi, 2000), the 
board size, the CEO duality leadership (Forker, 1992; Ho & Wong, 2001), ownership structure, and shareholder 
relationships (Ho & Wong, 2001; Chau & Gray, 2002). The French context is worth studying for many reasons: 1) 
France is a country which has been used as a typical representative of a weak investor protection country family (La 
Porta et al., 1999) leading to ownership concentration; 2) many French listed firms are controlled and managed by 
families, providing more opportunities to expropriate minority shareholders; 3) French regulation allows the use of 
double voting rights: this enables controlling shareholders to hold voting rights in excess of their cash flow rights, 
and exacerbates Type II agency conflict (Faccio & Lang, 2002). 
 
Using a logistic regression on a sample of 81 non-financial French listed firms for the year 2004, we find a 
negative relationship between disclosure quality and (1) ownership and control concentration, (2) family control and 
(3) double voting rights. We conclude that Type II agency conflicts negatively influence disclosure quality. With 
high ownership and control concentration, controlling shareholders are less reliant on minority shareholders and may 
expropriate them, particularly when their actions remain unpunished because of institutional context weakness. 
Consequently, controlling shareholders have fewer incentives to disclose information and will try to retain it to 
avoid minority contests. Interestingly, however, our result on the relationship between family control and disclosure 
of French firms contradicts the findings of Ali et al. (2007) in the US context, suggesting that Type II conflict is 
more severe in France (La Porta et al., 2000). We find – perhaps surprisingly – no evidence of the influence of board 
characteristics on disclosure quality. Finally, the regression results show a positive relationship between disclosure 
quality and executive stock option plans. We suggest that executive stock option plans protect minority shareholders 
R 
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from expropriation by controlling shareholders, thereby compensating for the deficiencies in regulation to protect 
investors. 
 
Our study contributes to the existing literature by providing new evidence on the growing agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders while prior studies focus on manager-shareholder agency conflict 
(Barros et al., 2013). Our research also incites regulators to pay more attention to principal-principal conflicts. 
Present French regulations on corporate governance focus on manager-shareholder agency conflict, whereas the 
main agency conflict in France is in fact the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews prior literature and presents the 
hypothesis development. Section three provides the research design. Results and conclusions are reported in sections 
four and five respectively. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Code law countries (such as France) offer weak investor protection compared to common law countries (La 
Porta et al., 1999). Corporate governance plays a key role to safeguard the financial reporting process (Bassett et al., 
2007). Hence, corporate governance mechanisms, at the firm-level can supplement weakness of the country-level 
regulation to protect investors. The corporate governance attributes examined in this study are board characteristics 
(board size, proportion of independent directors in the board, unitary leadership structure – where the same person is 
CEO and chairman of the board), existence of executive stock options, and ownership structure. 
 
2.1 Corporate Disclosure and Minority Expropriation 
 
Previous studies point out that widely-held firms suffer from more severe manager-shareholder conflict 
than their counterparts; consequently, the demand for public information is higher (Gelb, 2000; Chau & Gray, 
2002). However, in a context of ownership concentration (for instance France) agency conflicts result more from 
conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (principal-principal problem) (Fan & Wong, 
2005), and therefore disclosure should be affected differently. Because of their proximity to management, 
controlling shareholders can obtain private information (Johnson et al., 2000) and are therefore reluctant to publicly 
disclose information to avoid minority contests. Also, Fan and Wong (2002) find that controlling shareholders report 
accounting information for self-interested purposes, which results in less credibility in reported earnings. Similarly, 
Attig et al. (2006) posit that controlling shareholders have incentives to minimize and delay corporate disclosure. 
Lower and/or later disclosure helps controlling shareholders to increase the chance of executing their plans or to 
ensure minority shareholders’ decisions are based on inadequate information (Attig et al., 2006). Thus, disclosure 
quality should be poor in firms with high ownership concentration. We state the first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  There is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and ownership concentration. 
 
Controlling shareholders hold a high percentage of voting rights; they can therefore easily control the firm, 
and it is their disclosure strategy which leads to poor disclosure quality. Control concentration creates an 
entrenchment problem that allows controlling owners’ self-dealings to go unchallenged internally by boards of 
directors or externally by takeover markets (Fan & Wong, 2005). Also, due to the entrenchment effect that comes 
with control of the firm (Morck et al., 1988), controlling shareholders’ decisions deprive minority shareholders of 
their information rights particularly in a context of weak legal system (Fan & Wong, 2002). We present the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and controlling shareholder voting rights. 
 
The non-respect of the “one share one vote” rule in France (via double voting rights for instance) confirms 
weak investor protection in France (La Porta et al., 2000) and gives controlling shareholders voting rights in excess 
of their cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2005). Agency theory argue that the principal-principal 
problem resulting from the lack of convergence between the interests of controlling shareholders and those of 
minority investors is magnified when there is a discrepancy between cash flow and control rights (Boubaker & 
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Sami, 2011; Liu & Magnan, 2011). For instance, Attig et al. (2006) find that stocks with greater deviation between 
ultimate control and ownership have a larger information asymmetry component in their bid–ask spread, suggesting 
poor disclosure quality in these firms. This result is also consistent with Schmid (2009) who observe that the 
deviation of control from ownership is associated with more selfish behavior by the ultimate shareholder. Hence, we 
pose the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: There is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and the separation between voting rights and 
cash flow rights. 
 
France has a higher proportion of family-owned and controlled companies than Anglo-American countries: 
more than 50% of French firms are controlled by family groups (Faccio & Lang, 2002). In family firms, family 
members actively participate in the management of the firm and serve as directors on their board (Yoshikawa & 
Rasheed, 2009; Ho & Fei, 2013). They therefore have private information to assess the return on their investment. 
Comparing to non-family firms, family firms need less external financing and consequently, external information 
demand is low. Thus, consistent to the information financing need hypothesis, family firms have less incentive to 
disclose (Chau & Gray, 2002; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). 
 
Other studies evidence that compared to non-family firms, family firms face less severe manager-
shareholder conflict, but more severe principal-principal conflict (Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Ho & Fei, 
2013). These characteristics are likely to influence disclosure quality. First, because of less separation between 
ownership and management, family firms present lower Type I agency conflict, less information asymmetry and 
better disclosure quality. Second, when the controlling shareholder is a family, it has more strong incentives to 
expropriate minority shareholders than a widely held corporation because private benefits of control are not diluted 
among several independent owners ultimately (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Thus, Type II agency conflict is higher in 
family firms. Also, family shareholders can easily extract private benefits with the help of a board dominated by 
family members that can strongly influence its decisions (Hope et al., 2012). Consequently, they have incentives to 
limit disclosure in order to continue to easily expropriate private benefits. 
 
To summarize, difference in the quality of disclosure between family and non-family firms would depend 
on the difference in the severity of their Type I and Type II agency problems. For instance, Chen et al. (2008) 
examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms and find that compared to non-family firms, family firms 
provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls, whereas Ali et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between 
disclosure and family ownership suggesting that Type I conflict exceeds Type II conflict in the USA. The 
characteristics of French family firms raise interesting questions about their corporate disclosure practices. We 
suggest that French family firms face more severe Type II conflicts than their American counterparts and that these 
conflicts exceed Type I agency conflicts. We therefore state the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: Family-controlled firms provide poor disclosure quality. 
 
2.2 Corporate Disclosure and Board Characteristics 
 
Adoption of internal control devices such as independent directors, small-sized boards, and separation of 
the roles of chairman and chief executive officer reduce agency conflicts (Baek et al., 2009) and could therefore 
reduce the benefits to be derived from withholding information. Consequently, such measures help to improve 
disclosure quality. 
 
Inclusion of independent directors on corporate boards is a question that has received increasing attention 
from French regulations (Vienot report (1995), Bouton report (2002)). Chen and Jaggi (2000) present two main 
arguments in support of independent directors. First, independent directors advise corporate boards on strategic 
decisions (for instance disclosure decisions). Second, boards with a higher proportion of independent directors 
exercise greater control and greater monitoring over managerial decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Barako et al., 
2006); while boards dominated by non-independent directors, are more aligned with the manager which could harm 
shareholder interests and firm transparency. It is also assumed that independent directors have incentives to exercise 
their role of decision control in order to maintain reputational capital (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Baker et al., 2011). 
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Inclusion of independent directors on boards is thus expected to improve the firm's compliance with 
disclosure requirements, which in turn, will enhance the comprehensiveness and quality of disclosure. Previous 
studies show a positive relationship between disclosure quality and the proportion of independent directors on the 
board (Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Barako et al., 2006; Nelson et al., 2010; Barros et al., 2013). Also, Patelli and Prencipe 
(2007) argue that independent directors represent an important control mechanism to protect the interests of non-
controlling shareholders in the presence of a dominant shareholder. Thus, this control mechanism should 
counterbalance lobbying by non-independent directors who are more aligned with controlling shareholders. We state 
hypothesis H5: 
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and disclosure quality. 
 
When the CEO is also the chairman, the board cannot be an effective means to control management 
decisions, because obviously it is difficult to go against top management decisions when the chairman of the board 
is also part of the top management. Previous research has argued that CEO duality leadership harms shareholder’s 
interests because it leads to greater managerial dominance since that individual is more aligned with management 
than with shareholders (Mak & Li, 2001; Hope & Thomas, 2008). Ho and Wong (2001) assert that firms with CEO 
duality leadership enable the person who occupies both roles to withhold unfavourable information. Also, Forker 
(1992) finds that CEO duality leadership is negatively associated with disclosure quality. Based on these arguments, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality leadership and disclosure quality. 
 
While numerous studies have investigated the effects of board size on board effectiveness, empirical 
evidence is rather inconsistent. One explanation is the existence of two opposite directions (Jensen, 1993). First, 
large boards are more likely to attract directors for reputation issue, and have independent directors with corporate 
or financial experience (John & Senbet, 1998; Xie et al., 2003). Thus, a larger board might be better to enhance 
corporate governance. Second, this benefit may be offset by the incremental cost of poorer communication and 
decision-making inefficiencies that are often associated with large groups (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Thus, larger 
board size can reduce the board's ability to resist CEO control (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). Empirically, Yermack 
(1996) finds that firm valuation is negatively related to the size of the board. Consistent to these findings, Eisenberg 
et al. (1998) show a negative correlation between firms' profitability and board size in a sample of small and midsize 
Finnish firms. Thus, there seems no theory of prior evidence to find the association between board size and 
disclosure quality. Hypothesis H7 is thus stated in the null form: 
 
H7: There is no relationship between board size and disclosure quality. 
 
2.3 Corporate Disclosure and Executive Stock Option Plans 
 
Managers who benefit from stock option plans are presumed to be concerned about the economic 
consequences of their decisions, since their personal wealth depends on the value of their firm. Stock-price-based 
incentives in the form of stock-options mitigate the manager-shareholder agency problem. 
 
Disclosure enhances stock liquidity and firm value (Iatridis & Alexakis, 2012), and therefore managers 
interested in exercising their stock options have incentives to improve disclosure so as to profit from these benefits. 
Empirically, Nagar et al. (2003) examine a sample of 1129 firms during 1992-1995 and evidence a positive relation 
between managers' disclosure activities and their stock-price-based incentives. They show that firms' disclosures are 
positively related to the proportion of CEO compensation affected by share price, and suggest that shareholders 
deliberately use stock options to reach their target level of disclosure. We thus hypothesize that firms offering their 
managers stock option plans should have good quality of disclosure, and our hypothesis H8 is as follows: 
 
H8: There is a positive relationship between disclosure quality and the existence of executive stock option 
plans. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Sample and Data 
 
Our initial sample consists of all French listed firms included in the SBF 120 index in 2004. As in prior 
studies, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) since they operate in an environment where disclosure is 
more likely to be the result of specific legal and regulatory requirements rather than a response to agency conflict 
concerns (19 observations). We discard all firms with missing financial or corporate governance data (20 
observations). The final sample thus comprised 81 companies. Board and ownership data, as well as stock options 
data, were hand-collected from firms’ annual reports, available from the AMF (financial market authority)’s 
website. Financial data are retrieved from the Compustat database. 
 
We chose the SBF120 firms and the year 2004 because of information availability on the disclosure quality 
variable. 
 
First, disclosure quality is a very difficult variable to measure in the French context. In the USA, a number 
of organizations assess firms’ disclosures, for example the AIMR/CFA (Association of Investment Management 
Research, now the CFA institute), and the FAF (Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee). 
These organizations publish disclosure scores for a wide range of companies over a long period. Unfortunately, 
there are no similar data available for France. Also, disclosure score made by authors could suffer from subjectivity 
(choice of items list and items weight) (Marston & Shrives, 1991). 
 
Second, previous studies in France use the AGEFI best annual report prize to measure disclosure quality 
(Labelle & Schatt, 2005). Similarly, we use the AGEFI prize to select firms with good disclosure quality. The 
AGEFI study awarded prizes to French listed companies for their quality of disclosure, measured by listing segment 
(e.g. alternative, and over-the-counter markets), disclosure channel (e.g. annual reports) and type of operations on 
the market (e.g. first-time listing). As prior research shows a positive relationship between the whole corporate 
disclosure level and the level of information included in the annual report (Lang & Lundholm, 1993), we focus on 
AGEFI best annual report prize. 
 
AGEFI study presents a short list of companies from the SBF120 index that were nominated for the best 
annual report prize. Following prior study (Labelle & Schatt, 2005), we consider that shortlisted firms present good 
disclosure quality. Our dependent variable DISCL equals 1 if the firm was shortlisted and 0 otherwise. 
 
Since the first adoption of IFRS in 1/1/2005 for consolidated financial statements affects disclosure quality, 
we exclude all the years after 2004. Also, the annual report prize was discontinued after 2008 and the data from 
2005-2008 are not available. Our choice of the year 2004 is justified by the fact that it is the last year available that 
takes into account the consequences of the NRE act (2001) and the LSF act (2003) (corporate governance 
regulation). 
 
3.2 Model 
 
We use the following regression model to test our hypotheses: 
 
DISCLi = 0 + 1 HERFIi + 2 VOT1i + 3 VOT2i + 4 DBLEi + 5 FAMi + δ1BOARDi + δ2INDEPENDi + δ3DUALi 
+ δ4SOi + 

5
1j
j FSCONTROL + i : 
 
Where DISCL measures disclosure quality and FSCONTROL denotes firm-specific variables. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Empirical Definition Data Source 
Dependent Variable for Firm i  
discl i = 1 if firm i is shortlisted in the AGEFFI study, and 0 otherwise AGEFFI Euronext study 
Test Variables for Firm i  
herfi i = Herfindahl index measuring ownership concentration Annual report 
vot1 i = % of voting rights of the largest shareholder Annual report 
vot2 i = % of voting rights of the 2
nd largest shareholder Annual report 
dble i = 1 if firm i uses double voting rights, and 0 otherwise Annual report 
va1 i = voting rights/cash flow rights of the largest shareholder (alternative measure) Annual report 
fam i = 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder is a family, and 0 otherwise Annual report 
independ i  = % of independent directors on the board Annual report 
direct i = number of independent directors on the board (alternative measure) Annual report 
dual i = 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise Annual report 
board i = number of directors in the board Annual report 
stock i= 1 if the firm offers executive stock options, and 0 otherwise Annual report 
Control Variables for Firm i  
listingi= 1 if firm i is listed on a foreign market, and 0 otherwise Compustat 
uscoti= 1 if firm i is listed on the US stock market, and 0 otherwise Compustat 
logasstoti= natural log of total assets in thousands of Euros  Compustat 
cac40i= 1 if firm i is part of the CAC40 index, and 0 otherwise Compustat 
debti= leverage ratio Compustat 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2a and Table 2b. 
 
Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables 
 N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Board 81 10.827 3.794 4.000 8.000 11.000 14.000 17.000 
Independ 81 0.431 0.210 0.000 0.313 0.444 0.600 0.750 
Herfi 81 0.148 0.160 0.003 0.023 0.063 0.243 0.510 
Vot1 81 0.337 0.246 0.050 0.120 0.270 0.540 0.820 
Vot2 81 0.082 0.069 0.000 0.030 0.060 0.130 0.240 
Va1 81 1.217 0.271 1.000 1.000 1.050 1.360 1.800 
Debt 81 0.225 0.136 0.010 0.120 0.230 0.310 0.460 
Asstot 81 8181 1551 5920 6930 7960 9490 10970 
Direct 81 4.815 2.757 0.000 2.000 5.000 7.000 10.000 
 
Table 2b: Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables 
 Variables Observations Frequency 
Discl 
Poor disclosure quality 57 70.37 
Good disclosure quality 24 29.63 
Dual 
No leadership duality 33 40.74 
Leadership duality 48 59.29 
Fam 
Non family-controlled 40 49.38 
Family-controlled 41 50.62 
Dble 
No double voting right shares 37 45.68 
Double voting right shares 44 54.32 
Stock 
No executive stock option plans 32 39.51 
Executive stock option plans 49 60.49 
Listing 
No foreign listing 43 53.09 
Foreign listing 38 46.91 
Cac40 
Non CAC40 firm 66 81.48 
CAC40 firm 15 18.52 
Uscot 
No US listing 61 75.31 
US listing 20 24.69 
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Descriptive statistics show that the majority shareholder’s average percentage of voting rights is 33.7%, 
and the average Herfindhal index is 0.148. These high values prove that ownership and control are concentrated in 
French firms, in contrast to the American firms studied in most prior research, which have diffuse control and 
ownership. Our results are consistent with the findings of La Porta et al.(2000). We also find that 50.62% of firms in 
the sample are controlled by families, which is similar to the findings of Faccio and Lang (2002). As expected, the 
descriptive statistics reveal that most of the sample firms display separation between voting rights and cash flow 
rights (54.32% of our firms use double voting rights). We also calculate the dominant shareholder's voting rights in 
relation to his cash flow rights, and find that the voting rights of the dominant shareholder exceeds their cash flow 
rights by 21.7% on average. These results prove ownership concentration, the predominance of family-controlled 
firms, and the separation between ownership and control in France. We conclude that this context is appropriate to 
examine principal-principal conflicts (controlling vs. minority shareholders). 
 
Among the sample of 81 firms, 24 firms were shortlisted for the prize, indicating that they offer good 
disclosure quality. These firms represent 29.63% of the total sample. Table 3a and Table 3b present the 
characteristics of the two subsamples: firms with good disclosure quality and firms with poor disclosure quality. 
 
Table 3a: Summary Statistics of the Dependant Variable 
 DISCL = 1 DISCL = 0 
 N mean sd min max N mean sd min max 
Board 24 12.000 3.502 7.000 18.000 57 10.351 3.824 4.000 16.000 
Independ 24 0.569 0.163 0.313 0.800 57 0.376 0.203 0.000 0.700 
Herfi 24 0.039 0.045 0.000 0.148 57 0.195 0.173 0.005 0.543 
Vot1 24 0.148 0.092 0.020 0.290 57 0.414 0.250 0.060 0.830 
Vot2 24 0.086 0.074 0.010 0.280 57 0.082 0.070 0.000 0.240 
Va1 24 1.220 0.326 1.000 1.870 57 1.219 0.254 1.000 1.770 
Debt 24 0.258 0.131 0.040 0.460 57 0.213 0.140 0.010 0.500 
Asstot 24 8973 1464 6490 11250 57 7836 1480 5800 10570 
Direct 24 6.583 2.320 2.000 10.000 57 4.035 2.521 0.000 9.000 
 
Table 3b: Summary Statistics of the Dependant Variable 
  Dual Dble Fam Stock Listing Cac40 Uscot 
  % % % % % % % 
DISCL = 1 
0 33.33 62.50 87.50 12.50 25.00 66.67 50.00 
1 66.67 37.50 12.50 87.50 75.00 33.33 50.00 
DISCL = 0 
0 43.86 38.6 33.33 50.88 64.91 87.72 85.96 
1 56.14 61.4 66.67 49.12 35.09 12.28 14.04 
 
Many differences are observed between the two subsamples. Compared to firms with poor disclosure 
quality, firms with good disclosure quality are less controlled by families (12.5% vs. 66.67%), use double voting 
rights less (37.5% vs. 61.4%), have a higher proportion of independent directors on their boards (56.9% vs. 37.6%) 
and lower ownership concentration (0.039 vs. 0.195) and control concentration (14.8% vs. 41.4%). 
 
Table 4 discloses the correlation matrix for the dependent variable (discl) and the whole set of independent 
variables. 
 
The correlation matrix shows that the independent variable (discl) is negatively and significantly correlated 
at 1% with ownership concentration (herfi), control concentration (vot1), and family control (fam), and positively 
and significantly correlated at 1% with board independence (independ), executive stock options (stock), size 
(logasstot), US and foreign listing (uscot and listing). The independent variable is also positively (respectively 
negatively) correlated at 5% with cac40 (dble). The direction of correlations is consistent with our hypotheses. 
However, multivariate analysis must be run before reaching any conclusion on the relationships. 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
(1) discl 1
(2) board 0.18 1
(3) dual 0.098 0.27** 1
(4) independ 0.40*** 0.19* -0.00 1
(5) herfi -0.44*** -0.08 -0.06 -0.40*** 1
(6) vot1 -0.48*** -0.12 -0.00 -0.44*** 0.96*** 1
(7) vot2 0.00 0.06 -0.09 -0.034 -0.12 -0.08 1
(8) dble -0.22** -0.12 0.15 -0.097 -0.04 0.08 0.08 1
(9) fam -0.49*** -0.24** -0.07 -0.41*** 0.27** 0.36*** 0.15 0.33*** 1
(10) va1 -0.0150 -0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.29*** -0.20* 0.06 0.73*** 0.10 1
(11) stock 0.36*** 0.20* 0.15 0.31*** -0.35*** -0.33*** 0.12 0.12 -0.04 0.15 1
(12) listing 0.36*** 0.31*** 0.12 0.33*** -0.22** -0.26** -0.02 -0.28** -0.46*** -0.13 0.10 1
(13) debt 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.10 -0.32*** -0.26** 0.10 0.09 0.017 0.11 0.22* 0.10 1
(14) logasstot 0.32*** 0.65*** 0.20* 0.27** -0.15 -0.22** -0.21* -0.14 -0.42*** 0.06 0.12 0.45*** 0.16 1
(15) cac40 0.24** 0.38*** 0.27** 0.081 -0.20* -0.22** 0.02 0.05 -0.16 0.12 0.25** 0.19* 0.16 0.55*** 1
(16) uscot 0.38*** 0.26** 0.12 0.13 -0.20* -0.23** -0.06 -0.22** -0.18 -0.10 0.05 0.55*** 0.04 0.28** 0.17 1
N 81
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Board measures board size. Independ measures the % of independent directors on the board. Herfi measures the ownership concentration and is calculated by the sum of the squared 
percentage shareholdings. Vot1 and Vot2 are respectively the voting rights of the largest and second-largest shareholder. Va1 is the voting rights of the largest shareholder divided by the 
portion of shares held. Debt is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Asstot is the firm’s total asset value. Direct measures the number of independent directors. Dual is a binary variable that 
equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. Fam equals 1 if the largest shareholder is a family and 0 otherwise. Dble is a dichotomic variable indicating the 
existence of double voting rights. Stock is coded 1 if executives benefit from stock option plans and 0 otherwise. Listing equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed and 0 otherwise. Uscot equals 1 if 
the firm is US-listed and 0 otherwise. Cac40 equals 1 if the firm is part of the CAC40 index and 0 otherwise. 
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The magnitudes of the pairwise correlations between some independent variables exceed 0.5, with the 
highest significant correlation being between vot1 and herfi (coeff. = 0.96, p < 0.01) which explains the use of two 
models (Model 1 and Model 2). Va1 and dble are two variables measuring the extent of the separation between cash 
flow rights and voting rights, which explains the correlation concern observed between them (coeff. = 0.73, p < 
0.01). Also, board is positively and highly correlated with logasstot (coeff. = 0.65, p < 0.01). Tests are therefore 
performed to rule out any multicolinearity issue. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The multiple regression results are disclosed in Table 5, showing coefficients and Z-statistics respectively. 
Due to the multicolinearity issue between vot1 (measuring voting rights concentration) and herfi (measuring 
ownership concentration), we develop two models: Model 1 explains disclosure quality using vot1 while Model 2 
explains disclosure quality using herfi. 
 
Table 5: Logistic Regression 
Disclosure Quality Predicted Signs 
1 2 
β p β p 
herfi - -12.225** 0.044 
  
vot1 - 
  
-6.589* 0.065 
vot2 X 
  
6.152 0.326 
fam - -2.184** 0.016 -3.181*** 0.004 
dble - -1.582* 0.061 
  
va1 - 
  
-1.261 0.338 
independ + -0.485 0.838 
  
direct + 
  
-0.072 0.745 
dual - 0.04 0.964 -0.615 0.544 
board X -0.055 0.693 
  
stock + 2.076** 0.025 2.727** 0.012 
cac40 + 1.1 0.255 0.304 0.792 
listing + 0.566 0.524   
uscot + 
  
2.447** 0.027 
asstot + 
  
0.893 0.786 
constant 
 
0.585 0.792 -7.094 0.811 
N 
 
81 81 
Pseudo R-square 
 
0.495 0.536 
Correct rank 
 
87.65% 88.89% 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
 
First, we note that the 2 correct ranks are high, above 87.65%. Second, we find a negative and significant 
relationship between corporate disclosure and both ownership concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index (β 
= -12.225, p .044), and control concentration, measured by the controlling shareholders’ percentage of voting rights 
(β = -6.589, p .065). Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are thus confirmed. Our results are consistent with previous 
research conducted in a high ownership concentration and poor investor protection countries (Chau & Gray, 2002; 
Garcia-Meca & Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010; Gul et al., 2010). First, with high ownership, entrenched controlling owners 
have more with incentives and opportunities to extract private control benefits at the expenses of outside investors 
(Gul et al., 2010). Consequently, they withhold information in order to protect themselves and avoid minority 
contests. Also, when the controlling shareholders have a high proportion of voting rights, they can easily control the 
firm and manipulate its disclosures in order to continue expropriating minority interests. 
 
Previous research argues, “As the largest shareholder of a dual-class firm typically holds more than 50% of 
voting rights but substantially less than 50% of cash flow rights, he pays less than 50 cents for each dollar of private 
benefits extracted from the firm” (Schmid, 2009). Our results show that the coefficient for the variable measuring 
double voting rights is negative and significant (β = -1.582, p .061). Double voting rights give controlling 
shareholders proportionally more voting rights than their cash flow rights; as a result, their private benefits greatly 
exceed the potential value of firm losses due to decisions that harm the company’s interests. This result is consistent 
with Khalil et al. (2008) findings suggesting that the separation between cash flow rights and control rights arising 
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from the existence of dual-class shares exacerbates Type II conflict and explains the negative effect on disclosure. 
However, the negative coefficient of the variable va1 is not significant. Thus we could not validate our third 
hypothesis. 
 
As previously suggested, the impact of family control on disclosure reflects the difference between the 
respective effects of Type I and Type II agency conflicts (Chen et al., 2008). Similarly to Chau and Gray (2002), we 
find a negative and significant relationship between family control and disclosure quality, which confirms H4 (β = -
2.184, p .016 in Model 1 and β = -3.181, p .004 in Model 2). This result suggests that for family firms, the decrease 
in disclosure due to Type II agency conflict exceeds the increase in disclosure resulting from less severe Type I 
agency conflict. This result is the opposite of findings reported by Ali et al. (2007) on a sample of US firms. Thus, 
our results are consistent with La Porta et al. (2000), suggesting that French firms face more severe Type II agency 
conflict than their American counterparts. 
 
Surprisingly, our results provide no evidence that the board characteristics influence disclosure quality (H5, 
H6, and H7). Nevertheless, our results are similar to previous studies that find no significant relation between 
disclosure level and board independence (Molz, 1988; Ho & Wong, 2001), board size (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006) 
or CEO duality (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). One possible explanation is the substitution effect of governance 
mechanisms (Williamson, 1983). Disclosure seems to make up for the ineffectiveness of a failing mechanism such 
as the separation of the two functions cited above, or independent directors. 
 
With regard to the impact of executive stock options on disclosure quality, we find a positive and 
significant coefficient of the variable stock (β = 2.076, p .025). We confirm therefore the existence of a positive 
relationship between disclosure quality and executive stock option plans: Hypothesis H8 is validated. This result is 
similar to prior literature (Nagar et al., 2003; Lakhal, 2007). We suggest that managers are motivated to enhance 
disclosure in order to increase profitability, growth, and liquidity (Iatridis & Alexakis, 2012) and improve their 
wealth. 
 
Finally, we find a positive relationship between US listing and disclosure quality, and no relationship 
between disclosure quality and cross-listing. We conclude that the American market is more demanding as regards 
to information than other markets. Firms listed on the American market are subject to very strict financial disclosure 
requirements. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although the French legal context provides less investor protection than the American context (La Porta et 
al., 2000), many corporate governance laws have been enacted in recent years. First, the LSF Act (2003), similar to 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA, required companies to report to the general shareholders’ meeting on the 
organization of the board’s work, internal control procedures and delegation of powers. Second, the NRE Act (2001) 
reinforced requirements on disclosure of shareholder agreements and encouraged disclosure of shareholder 
identities; it also enlarged the shareholder’s right to information by eliminating the minimum number of shares 
needed to participate in the general meeting. 
 
This paper examines whether the disclosure quality of French firms is a function of corporate governance 
mechanisms. It makes a useful contribution by testing this relationship in the light of two factors showing important 
institutional differences compared to previous studies, which have mainly concerned the US: ownership 
concentration (Faccio & Lang, 2002) and poor investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000). These differences make 
French context interesting because it allows us to highlight a rarely-studied agency conflict: the conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Type II conflict). This study thus adds to the growing principal-
principal conflict literature. This conflict has been less extensively examined in the accounting literature than Type I 
agency conflict (manager/shareholder conflict), once again because most prior studies have been conducted in 
common law countries, mainly the USA. Also and surprisingly, the few studies made in France focus on Type I 
agency conflict (Labelle & Schatt, 2005; Barros et al., 2013) while the main conflict is the one between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). 
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Our study supports the hypothesis that Type II agency conflict influence negatively disclosure quality, 
consistent with the fact that investors are not as well protected in code law countries (such as France) as in common 
law countries. Disclosure quality is shown to be weak in firms with both high ownership and voting rights 
concentration, and where controlling shareholders, mainly families, hold double voting right shares. Double voting 
rights help controlling shareholders to not bear all the consequences of their decisions, and therefore give them more 
opportunities to expropriate minority shareholders. This situation exacerbates principal-principal conflict and leads 
controlling shareholders to withhold information in order to avoid minority contests. 
 
We find that family firms have poor disclosure quality consistent to prior results found in East Asia, a 
context characterized by ownership concentration and the dominance of family firms (Chen et al., 2008; Chau & 
Gray, 2010). Nevertheless, these findings contradict the results of Ali et al. (2007) in the American context, 
suggesting that French family firms face higher Type II agency conflict than their American counterparts (La Porta 
et al., 2000). We also find that executive stock options protect minority shareholders’ rights and result in better 
disclosure quality. As suggested before, we argue that corporate governance mechanisms are likely to supplement 
regulation to protect investor rights. In systems with weak legal investor protection, executive stock options could 
protect minority shareholders from controlling shareholder expropriation. 
 
This study does however have some limitations. First, it was difficult to measure disclosure quality in 
France due to the absence of disclosure assessments similar to the FAF and AIMR disclosure scores in the US. We 
use the nominations for the AGEFI's best annual report prize as a binary dependent variable to measure disclosure 
quality, but this involves a lack of variability and reduces the choice of possible methodologies. Second, although 
we use many control variables in our regression, more control variables such as industry sector and growth ratio 
could be introduced to control for disclosure quality: we were unable to do this due to our small sample size. Also, 
controlling for endogeneity could enhance our model specification. Despite these limitations, our results provide a 
better understanding of the disclosure determinants related to corporate governance mechanisms, and may prove 
useful for standard-setters and regulators. This study calls regulation authorities to draw more attention to Type II 
agency conflict in future law enforcement. 
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